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“YOU HAVE BEEN IN AFGHANISTAN”: A
DISCOURSE ON THE VAN ALSTYNE METHOD
GARRETT EPPS †
INTRODUCTION
It is a signal honor to be invited to pay tribute to a professional
mentor as significant in one’s career as Professor William Van
Alstyne has been in mine. Yet one must be careful to neither overnor underestimate the honor paid; I and the other authors in this
Symposium are called into action largely in the kind of role played in
professional basketball by the New York Nationals, whose sole
function it is to underscore the greatness of the Harlem Globetrotters
by playing the game as well as they can and then losing. There is
nonetheless still honor of a sort involved in being used as the metric
by which the greatness of the Globetrotters is measured: if the
Globetrotters might be considered to have the skill of N x (the New
York Nationals), it is nonetheless also necessarily true that N is some
positive real number, thus locating the Nationals on the same X-axis
as the Globetrotters. Bill Van Alstyne is the Meadowlark Lemon1 of
American constitutional law, and for any of us to be on the same axis
with him is quite enough of an honor for one career, even though we
cannot spin the ball as nimbly as he can.
In my own case, the honor is particularly appreciated because
Bill Van Alstyne ’s influence on my career began even before my legal
education, and indeed strongly influenced my decision to study law
and my choice of Duke as the place where I would study it. When I
think back on my years as his student, I am reminded of the finest

Copyright © 2005 by Garrett Epps.
† Orlando John and Marian H. Hollis Professor of Law, University of Oregon. Duke
University School of Law, J.D., 1991, LL.M., 1994. I would like to thank Professor Christopher
Schroeder and the Duke Public Law Program for the invitation to participate in this outstanding
Symposium, and Professor William Van Alstyne for his example, his instruction, and his
encouragement over the years of our friendship. Emmet Soper provided research assistance.
1. Lemon was the most famous Globetrotter, known for his dazzling ball-handling skills.
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account of graduate professional training ever written in the English
language, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle ’s A Study in Scarlet, Part I, Being a
Reprint from the Reminiscences of John H. Watson, M.D., Late of the
Army Medical Department.2 When Dr. Watson first meets Holmes,
the young detective greets him by saying, “You have been in
Afghanistan, I perceive.”3 Holmes’s deduction, and the method by
which it is reached, form the foundation for Watson’s lifelong
fascination with Holmes and his methods. Note that the
acquaintanceship begins, not with remarks by Holmes about himself,
but with an observation by Holmes about Watson. Education, when
properly carried on, functions not to convey to us information that
exists outside ourselves but to show to us understandings and
capabilities that are already dormant within us. Certainly Bill Van
Alstyne did, and does, this for me. Like Kingsfield in John Jay
Osborne’s The Paper Chase,4 Bill Van Alstyne trains my mind; I come
to him with a skull full of mush5 and leave thinking, if not really like a
lawyer, then at least a bit more like Bill.
My own first encounter with Bill—what we might call the
“Afghanistan moment” of our relationship—occurred while I was still
a newspaper reporter. I was covering a conference on church-state
issues convened by a statewide group of clergy and lay people in
North Carolina. The year was 1985, and the sponsors of the
conference had become alarmed by the rancorous tone of religious
and political debate in the wake of the twin reelections of Ronald
Reagan and Jesse Helms. Conferees were worrying at perennial
questions about American public life: What is the place of religion in
our political discourse? To what extent are American institutions a
product of a specific “Judeo-Christian” religious tradition? Does the
Constitution permit government to accommodate or even encourage
religion as a means of promoting republican values and social
stability?
One of the speakers was a senior member of the faculty at a fine
law school that is not Duke. Though it is not his real name, for the
purposes of this paper I shall call him Professor “Moriarty.”

2. SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, A Study in Scarlet, in 1 SHERLOCK HOLMES: THE
COMPLETE N OVELS AND STORIES 1, 1 (reissue ed., Bantam Classics 2003) [hereinafter
SHERLOCK HOLMES].
3. 1 id. at 7.
4. JOHN JAY OSBORN, JR., THE PAPER CHASE (1971).
5. Id. at 17–21.
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“Moriarty” had proposed in his paper that the proper role of
government was in effect to smooth the ground and prepare the way
so that religious belief and observance may flourish among the
people, inspiring them to participate properly in American civic life.
In particular, he ridiculed as excessively scrupulous a court’s
insistence that the municipal police of Bernalillo County, New
Mexico, cease displaying on their vehicles the county seal, a Latin
cross above the motto “Con Esta Vencemos.”6 One of the speakers
was William Van Alstyne. Luckily I need not rely on my own meager
verbal skills to evoke the striking figure he cut; I rely instead on
Watson for his description of the young Sherlock Holmes (Doyle
does not mention in this passage the constant pipe smoking that is
another characteristic Holmes and Van Alstyne share):
His very person and appearance were such as to strike the attention
of the most casual observer. In height he was rather over six feet,
and so excessively lean that he seemed to be considerably taller. His
eyes were sharp and piercing, . . . and his thin, hawk-like nose gave
his whole expression an air of alertness and decision. His chin, too,
had the prominence and squareness which mark the man of
determination. His hands were invariably blotted with ink . . . . 7

With some trepidation, I went over, notebook in hand, to ask this
formidable figure what he planned to say. Bill gave me a very clear
and direct answer. “Professor ‘Moriarty’ has delivered a thoroughly
shoddy paper,” he said. “I intend to demolish it.”8
As a newcomer to sanguinary academic battles, I was transfixed
by the ensuing onslaught. Bill zeroed in closely on the issue of the
county seal, and drew upon his knowledge of the history of
Christianity and its iconography to demonstrate that the joining of the
Latin cross with the message of conquest violated the deepest beliefs
not only of non-Christians but even of a large number of Christians as
well. In retrospect, it reminds me of the great battle between Holmes
6. “With this we conquer. ” Compare the revelation supposedly supplied to the Emperor
Constantine, who saw a cross in the sky and heard the words “in hoc signo vinces”—”in this sign
you will conquer. ” Constantine then proclaimed Christianity as the official religion of the
Roman Empire. On the Bernalillo case, see A.C.L.U. Wants Cross Removed From New Mexico
County’s Seal, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1980, at A18; see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs,
781 F.2d 777, 780–81 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (reversing the District Court’s judgment that the
County seal did not send a message of religious endorsement and exclusion).
7. 1 SHERLOCK HOLMES, supra note 2, at 11.
8. “[Moriarty] is the Napoleon of crime, Watson.” 2 SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The
Final Problem, in SHERLOCK HOLMES, supra note 2, at 736, 740.
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and Moriarty at the Reichenbach Fall,9 with the sole difference being
that when it was over, one body, not two, fell into the raging torrent
to be dashed against the rocks.
Thus I was fully forewarned of the potential consequences when
I first assayed to cross swords with Bill on a point of constitutional
law. Early in my law school career I became one of the legions of
students who haunted Bill’s office between classes.10 My presence
arose partly out of curiosity and partly out of the fact that Bill’s office
was, in those innocent days, a last holdout of the losing army in the
great smoking wars of the 1980s and 1990s. (Among Holmes’s first
words to Watson were, “You don’t mind the smell of strong tobacco,
I hope?”)11 As a tobacco abuser myself, I formed the habit of
dropping by during my first year of law school ostensibly to discuss
the law with Bill while we enjoyed a mutual taste of the forbidden
leaf. On one such occasion I unwisely ventured an opinion that the
federal government might, without violating the First Amendment,
pass a statute forbidding newspapers and broadcasters from revealing
the results of exit polls of voters conducted anywhere on election day
until the polls had closed all over the country.
At once Bill decided that the game was afoot. His argument
(almost certainly correct) was that the First Amendment surely
forbade even the temporary suppression of truthful reporting about
such a core function of our political system, particularly when the
reason why it was being suppressed was a fear that listeners would
hear and act upon it. I, in proper New York National fashion,
stubbornly insisted that free voting is centrally important to the
health of our system of government, and that its protection arguably
constituted precisely the sort of “compelling interest” that could and
should be protected by a narrowly tailored, temporary prohibition—a
kind of “time, place, and manner” restriction. I might say that we
went at it for an hour or so hammer and tongs, but I am reluctant to
claim for myself the dignity of the tongs. Bill hammered at me for
sixty minutes; suddenly he realized not that I was right (I probably
wasn’t and he certainly didn’t think that I was) but simply that, lowly
first-year law student though I might be, I wasn’t going to snap no

9. See 2 id. at 751–55 (detailing the battle in which Holmes and Moriarty apparently
perish).
10. “It is the unofficial force—the Baker Street irregulars.” 1 SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE,
The Sign of Four, in SHERLOCK HOLMES, supra note 2, at 121, 184.
11. 1 SHERLOCK HOLMES, supra note 2, at 9.
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matter how many strokes of the hammer befell me. He suddenly fell
silent, puffing on his briar pipe, and looked at me with a touch of
admiration and surprise. “I say, Garrett,” he said at last, “good
show!”
Our professional friendship has been particularly profitable to
me because it has consistently required me to cope —either explicitly,
in discussions with Bill, or implicitly, in my own internal dialogue—
with the objections that Bill raises or that he would raise to my own
work. As someone whose analytical style is quite different from his, I
have had to study the Van Alstyne method and learn to apply it
myself, if for no other reason than to protect myself from the kind of
demolition that befell the hapless Professor “Moriarty.”
In Part I of this Essay, I set out what I conceive to be the Van
Alstyne method and compare it in particular to the foundational
methodological document of modern philosophy, Discourse on the
Method by René Descartes.12 In Part II, I then attempt to apply the
method to an unsettled doctrinal area about which Bill and I
frequently speak and somewhat less frequently disagree, the proper
scope of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Using
Bill’s own ambition of “squaring” a government enactment with a
constitutional provision, I explore the caselaw from Reynolds v.
United States13 to Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah,14 asking always whether a given proposed rule “interpret[s]
this Constitution”15 along the Cartesian/Van Alstynian axes of, first,
consistency and, second, lack of asserted extratextual interpretive
principle. In my conclusion, I suggest that the Van Alstyne method,
conscientiously applied, produces the somewhat surprising conclusion
that the Free Exercise jurisprudence of the Warren Court more fully
fulfills the method’s aim of fidelity to text than does the more
convoluted caselaw of the Rehnquist Court.

12.
(1637).
13.
14.
15.

R ENÉ DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD (George Heffernan ed., 1994)
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
WILLIAM W. V AN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (1984).
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I. “YOU KNOW MY METHODS” 16 : VAN ALSTYNE AND DESCARTES
To Bill, the word “lawyerlike” is the highest form of praise; by
this term, I think he means a kind of legal analysis that does not begin
with an intuitive perception of where the analyst wants the argument
to go, but that instead proceeds by assembling the relevant materials,
breaking the question down into its constituent parts, and finally
drawing the appropriate legal inferences from their relationships.
Only when one discerns the direction and shape assumed by these
elements can one then make a conclusion as to the correct result—if,
in fact, there is a correct result. Intuition—and, for that matter,
political or policy inclination—play almost no role in this process.
Bill has a B.A. in philosophy from the University of Southern
California, so it is almost certainly not a coincidence that the method
I have outlined bears a distinct resemblance to that set out by René
Descartes in Discourse on the Method,17 a work that is the foundation
of modern philosophy. The core of the “doubting method” can be
found in Descartes’ four maxims of analysis.
The first maxim is “never to accept anything as true that I did not
evidently know to be such; that is to say, carefully to avoid
precipitation and prejudice.”18 (Holmes seemed to echo this precept
when he said, “It is a capital mistake to theorize before you have all
the evidence. It biases the judgment.”)19 The second of Descartes’
principles is “to divide each of the difficulties that I would examine
into as many parts as would be possible and as would be required in
order better to resolve them.”20 The third is “to conduct my thoughts
in an orderly manner, by beginning with those objects the most simple
and the most easy to know, in order to ascend little by little, as by
degrees, to the knowledge of the most composite ones.”21 (As Holmes
writes, “Before turning to those moral and mental aspects of the
matter which present the greatest difficulties, let the inquirer begin by
mastering more elementary problems.”)22 Descartes’ fourth rule is
“everywhere to make enumerations so complete and reviews so
16. 1 SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The Stock-Broker’s Clerk, in SHERLOCK HOLMES,
supra note 2, at 565, 567.
17. DESCARTES, supra note 12.
18. Id. at 35.
19. 1 SHERLOCK HOLMES, supra note 2, at 23.
20. DESCARTES, supra note 12, at 35.
21. Id.
22. 1 SHERLOCK HOLMES, supra note 2, at 16.
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general that I were assured of omitting nothing.”23 (Or, as Holmes
often said to Watson, “When you have eliminated the impossible,
whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.”24 )
As applied to the interpretation and application of legal tests, the
method then would suggest that a lawyer should begin with the
problem rather than the desired solution; should break the problem
down into its constituent factual predicates and legal principles at the
greatest possible level of specificity; should resolve each step of the
analysis as conclusively as possible before considering whither it
leads; and should not reject any potential interpretation simply on the
grounds that it is counterintuitive, politically una ppealing,
unfashionable, or previously unconsidered by commentators and
courts. This method is applied in Bill’s classic essay, “A Critical
Guide to Marbury v. Madison.”25 In that essay, Bill does not attempt
to channel the Framers and explain what they must have been
thinking; instead, like Descartes or Holmes, he turns carefully and in
exhaustive detail to what the Framers said in the Constitution and
projects from it a wide variety of meanings that could be given to the
idea of judicial review. It is a “doubting method” in that it gives no
deference to authority, whether that of Chief Justice Marshall or of
learned commentators, but directs all attention toward the interplay
of text and the necessary qualities of common law courts. As a
student, I derived from it the comfort of knowing first that even
brighter and more experienced minds than I found Marbury far from
perspicuously clear on first reading, and second that the institution of
judicial review in the United States today did not spring full grown
from the brow of Chief Justice Marshall but is instead a lawyer’s
construct derived from the practical realities of a common law judicial
system.
Useful as I found “Critical Guide” during law school, I found
another essay even more useful as I began my descent from eager law
student to jaded law professor. In 1984, Bill published a revealing
essay as the introduction to his influential book, Interpretations of the
First Amendment. The essay is called “Interpreting This Constitution:
On the Unhelpful Contribution of Special Theories of Judicial
Review.”26
23.
24.
25.
26.

DESCARTES, supra note 12, at 35.
1 SHERLOCK HOLMES, supra note 10, at 160.
William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1.
V AN ALSTYNE, supra note 15, at 3–20.
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The essay attacks certain theories offered by legal scholars as to
the proper role for courts to take in assessing constitutional
challenges to legislation. As in the fabulous confrontation with
Professor “Moriarty” (or as in Holmes’s bold confrontation with
Professor Moriarty), Bill does not shrink from combat merely
because of the number or stature of his foes. He attacks a league of
extraordinary gentlemen that includes James Bradley Thayer,
Herbert Wechsler, Gerald Gunther, John Hart Ely, Jesse Choper,
Charles Black, Owen Fiss, Ronald Dworkin, Frank Michelman, and
Laurence Tribe.27 Bill characterizes these worthies’ theories as
“special” because they do not rely upon textual application of the
Constitution’s provisions to concrete cases but, in effect, inject into
the process a notion of the proper role of the courts in constitutional
judicial review and then counsel greater or lesser deference to
legislative bodies depending upon the judges’ assessment of those
bodies’ democratic character or moral worth.
Bill offers up his own method for critique later in the essay. The
Van Alstyne method has two parts. It begins with a quote from
Justice Owen Roberts:
When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as
not conforming to the constitutional mandate, the judicial branch of
the Government has only one duty—to lay the article of the
Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged
and to decide whether the latter squares with the former. 28

It is easy, as Bill notes, to dismiss this dictum as a reductive apothegm
written by an “unremarkable” justice.29 Yet Bill still draws from it the
worthy suggestion “that the judicial task of constitutional review
should be performed with the same undissembling interest in
accuracy as one would bring to his or her own workbench”30 —that the
language of squaring constitution and statute provides a useful
metaphor of the judge as builder of a proper constitutional edifice in
which all angles are true and all corners square. The importance of
such measurement is that a judge is not to draw constitutional lines
with any presupposition as to the extent of the judiciary’s role in the

27. Id. at 7 & nn.21–26.
28. Id. at 12 (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 6, 62 (1936)).
29. Id. In addition, the “unrema rkable” Justice wrote his credo while reaching a decision
that many commentators, including this one, consider to be profoundly wrong.
30. Id. (emphasis added).
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constitutional system. The judge, in other words, is neither to defer to
arguably incorrect interpretations of the Constitution merely because
they have the imprimatur of the more “democratically ” elected
branches nor to view skeptically interpretations of the Constitution
offered by those branches merely because they are “political” rather
than “legal” or because they do not accord with the Court’s own
views as to the meaning of terms such as “justice” and “liberty.” In
addition, “[i]t is not the Court’s business to move [the line] or to
misrepresent its location from any presupposition of its own that a
different constitutional line might be better.”31 A builder does not use
a square to produce a desired result; the correctness of the builder’s
measurements can be objectively determined, even if specia lized
expertise may be needed to interpret them.
Because of the importance of the judge’s role in constitutional
judicial review, Bill suggests, the builder should follow the ancient
rule of “measure twice, cut once.” In other words, “[b]ecause it is
the Constitution being expounded, one should be especially
conscientious about its determination—should have an exceptional
willingness to listen, to consider, and to be very careful.”32 Again, it
would be possible to regard this as simply a jurisprudential bromide—
what school of judging, after all, suggests not listening? But in the
context of Bill’s criticism of “special” theories of judicial review, it in
fact seems to represent a reaffirmation of the judge’s role as one
derived from the common law, in which the contours of a case are
descried, not from a preexisting inclination of the judge to reach a
certain result—whether representation-reinforcing or economically
efficient—but from the judge’s sworn obligation to allow the law as it
is, the facts as they are found, and the arguments that the litigants
bring before the court jointly to determine the result. This is a judicial
canon of behavior that recent Courts have not always observed.
The “T-squaring” method does not presuppose that the holder of
the square will always be able to derive an answer. “‘[T]he line ’
representing the constitutional clause must at least be reasonably
discernible.”33 For this reason, “[d]etermining where the line
represented by a constitutional clause lies is in fact not the same as
the mechanical task of seeing whether one line ‘squares’ with

31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id. at 13 (footnote omitted).
Id.
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another.”34 The judge must first decide where the line is, which, Van
Alstyne concedes, is an interpretive, not a mechanical, task.35 And
because of the ambiguity of much of the language of the Constitution,
“many of the problems of constitutional adjudication are not
imagined, . . . they are not contrived, and . . . they do not proceed
solely from judges who are mere ideologues.”36
What, then, is the judicial role when the line is unclear?
Lawyerlike, Van Alstyne falls back on the concept of burden of proof
to provide a rule for resolving such questions. “[I]t is the litigant who
brings the claim asserting that there is some ‘line’ (i.e., some article or
combination of articles) in the Constitution with which an act does
not square” who must bear the burden of establishing the location of
the line; “If the location of that line cannot be established, necessarily
the claim must fail.”37 If the litigant cannot provide a fix on the line,
then the duty of the conscientious judge is to reject the claim—
regardless of its sympathetic nature or its congruence with current
theories of democracy, economic efficiency, or morality.
The burden to show where the constitutional line lies is not with the
Court. It is with the party who claims that the act of Congress does
not square with that line. The duty of the court is to entertain the
claim, to be attentive to it, to require no more of this litigant than
would be required of any other, in any other case, to show that “the
line lies here,” so then to see whether the act does not square.
Residual uncertainty thus does not impair performance of the
judicial function and nothing obliges the court to improvise the line
to accommodate the litigant or merely to fill out the Constitution in
some abstractly more satisfying way. Indeed, nothing entitles the
court to do any of these things. The judicial duty is not less fitly
performed because the party raising the challenge fails.38

The implications of this allocation of the burden are significant,
for they amount to a presumption that an act of Congress is valid.
“[W]hen an act of Congress otherwise applies to define a party’s
rights, it is to be deemed controlling in the Supreme Court unless the
litigant is able to show that, as applied, the act fails to square with

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.

012306 05_EPPS.DOC

2005]

2/6/2006 10:20 AM

VAN ALSTYNE METHOD

1565

some clause (or combination of clauses) in the Constitution.”39 Failing
such a demonstration, the act governs as the “supreme law of the
land”40 —even if it seems wrongheaded, draconian, unwise, or even
inconsistent with a constitutional provision that is “intractable for
litigant use.”41 It is thus not the duty of the courts to enforce an entire
“vision” of the Constitution that would explain and give effect to all
its provisions in conformity with an interpretation gleaned either
from history or from contemporary thought. “Intractable ” clauses of
the Constitution, though binding on all parties, will simply not lend
themselves to enforcement by the judiciary.
Bill elucidates the idea of burdens of proof more fully later in the
essay. He contends that some constitutional claims will put the
burden on the government to demonstrate the appropriate line and
its relationship to the Constitution. “Such an instance would arise
when the challenge is not on the basis that the applicable act of
Congress is forbidden but rather on the basis that it was not
authorized.”42 This type of claim differs from a claim that the
government is taking an action that the text forbids precisely in the
assignment of burdens; if a measure
is alleged not to square because there is no obvious enumerated
power or combination of powers sufficient to sustain the act in
question, the burden appropriately becomes that of the party relying
upon the act to show that, to the contrary, there is in fact ample
power. On the other hand, if the objection is that the act fails not for
want of original power to enact it but rather because other
constitutional provisions disallow it, the burden of succeeding on
that objection is equally clear; it is on the party who so asserts. 43

A scrupulous observance of these allocations of burdens would mean
that a court
is thus not bound at all costs to invent some meaning for every word
and clause in the Constitution. Rather, it is to measure the adequacy
of that meaning or that interpretation tendered by some party to the

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 16.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
Van Alstyne , supra note 25, at 15.
Id. at 17.
Id.
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litigation insofar as that tendered meaning or interpretation is relied
upon to show how an act of Congress does or does not ‘square.’ 44

Fully considered, then, the Van Alstyne method is far from
reductive. It readily admits the open-ended nature of many of the
Constitution’s provisions, it provides an ample role for the coordinate
branches of the government (and for the States) in interpreting and
acting upon the Constitution, and it assigns to judges a far more
modest role than that of the “Platonic guardians” against whom
Learned Hand warned.45 For it is one thing to say—as certain judicial
theorists on all sides of the ideological divide are wont to—that it is
the business of the Court to strike down legislation that the Court
believes to violate the Constitution; it is another thing—related, but
distinct and significantly narrower—to say that it is the business of the
Court to strike down legislation when and only when a party to
litigation can demonstrate that it either violates some provision of the
document or is simply not authorized by it anywhere. This role, if truly
adopted as an ope rating philosophy by judges, would be in keeping
with Alexander Hamilton’s apothegm that the judiciary, as set up
under the new Constitution of 1787, “ha[th] neither force nor will but
merely judgment.”46 Indeed, Bill’s objections to the “special” theories
of judicial review can thus be seen to be objections to the courts’
transgressing their proper roles—not in terms of other branches, or of
the States, but of the litigants who should properly shape the docket
and doctrine of a common law court.
Thus, then, the Van Alstyne method—Cartesian in its approach,
sophisticated in its view of the difficulties of the judicial role, and
modest about the proper place of the judiciary. Note, however, that
this modesty is not one imposed upon the Court by a political or
moral theory external to itself; it is in fact a kind of internal, or
procedural, modesty, imposed by the nature of courts (in this sense, it
is very like the “internal morality” that Professor Lon Fuller wrote
must inform the law because of its very nature as law47 ).
What ought we to make of this theory? To begin with, one is
tempted to respond to it as Gandhi reportedly did to the question,
44. Id. at 18.
45. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF R IGHTS 73 (1958)
46. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
47. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 4 (1964) (arguing that such an internal
morality makes law possible by “clarifying the directions of human effort essential to maintain
any system of law”).
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“What do you think of Western civilization?” “I think it would be a
very good idea.”48 Demonstrably, neither the Rehnquist Court nor its
immediate predecessors have adhered to this litigant-centered view of
the Court’s role.49 In fact, I am not sure of any historic period in
which the Court has so restrained itself. In the next Part, I examine
the Court’s shifting interpretations of the Free Exercise Clause to see
whether they qualify as applications of the T-square or as “special”
theories of judicial review. In particular, I make use of one of Bill’s
favorite devices, the Venn diagram, to probe whether a given case
makes use of a rule that consistently applies the Clause without nonCartesian presuppositions,50 and assess each possible rule for its
internal consistency and usefulness to courts. Or, as Holmes would
put it, “Come, Watson, come! . . . The game is afoot.”51
II. INTERPRETING THIS FREE
EXERCISE CLAUSE: A GRAPHIC REVIEW
The Constitution provides that Congress “shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.”52 It is futile to pretend that this disjunctive rule is all
one smooth whole. It imposes two disabilities upon Congress (and,
through the Fourteenth Amendment, upon the States): first,
government may not “establish” a favored religion or religions;
second, government may not obstruct the “free exercise” of any
religion at all, regardless of its view of it. That these are logically and
practically distinct can be seen by imagining in turn the Constitution
with only one of the two clauses. To begin with, the First Amendment
might perfectly coherently prohibit establishment of religion without
requiring any particular solicitude for the “free exercise” of religious
believers. This is the regime of secularism, in which the state regards
itself as supreme within its own sphere and simply makes no
concessions to religious beliefs and practices that may obstruct its
aim. France today operates under a constitutional provision

48. For a discussion of this “quote,” see, for example , THE COLUMBIA WORLD OF
QUOTATIONS (Robert Andrews et al. eds., 1996), available at http://www.bartleby.com/66/7
7/24377.html.
49. See infra Part II.
50. See supra notes 17–24 and accompanying text.
51. 1 SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The Adventure of the Abbey Grange, in SHERLOCK
HOLMES, supra note 2, at 1009, 1009.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. I. (emphasis added).
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proclaiming it “an indivisible, secular, democratic and social
Republic” that is bound to “respect all beliefs.”53 Because religious
conduct receives no textual protection, the French government can—
as the American probably could not—forbid female Muslim
schoolchildren to wear Islamic headscarves on the grounds that the
prohibition would further French values of equality and secularism.54
Even some American States, regrettably, enshrine secularism in their
own State constitutions—including my own State, Oregon, whose
courts readily uphold the validity of laws that suppress religious
behavior altogether and in fact neither require any heightened
showing of necessity by the State in such cases nor permit the
challenger even to offer evidence of the impact of the State law on his
or her religious rights.55 In such a regime, in other words, the duty of
courts “to listen, to consider, and to be very careful”56 in regard to
free exercise claims is nil.
By contrast, now imagine a system that incorporated a “free
exercise of religion” guarantee but provided no guarantee against
“establishment.” Again, this is a familiar system; it is called a regime
of toleration. The United Kingdom functions even today under such a
system; so, in a different way, does the Federal Republic of Germany.
A certain religion (or religions) receives state imprimatur and
funding, and sometimes privileged access to the state educational
system; beyond this official endorsement and funding, the state makes
no effort to coerce other believers or nonbelievers to adhere to the
favored religion. Dissenters are permitted to believe, profess, and
practice their disfavored faith without any material penalty, subject at
most to formal regulation in such areas as registration and
organization.57

53. CONST. art. I (Fr.), translated in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD, pt. 2, at 1 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 2003) (emphasis added).
54. See UN Rights Official Objects to French Ban on Muslim Headscarves, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 22, 2004 (reporting on the uproar surrounding French passage of such a
ban).
55. See Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 4J, 723 P.2d 298, 313–14 (Or. 1986) (allowing a
Sikh teacher to be summarily dismissed by her public school for wearing clothing required by
her religion); State v. Soto, 537 P.2d 142, 144 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (affirming a trial court ’s
refusal even to hear defendant’s evidence of the religious nature of his peyote possession).
56. V AN ALSTYNE, supra note 15, at 13 (footnote omitted).
57. Alas, it must be noted that a significant number of Americans believe that the
American States are required by the Constitution only to observe some relatively tepid
approximation of tole ration. Former Chief Justice Roy Moore of Alabama and his conservative
supporters report themselves cheerfully willing to allow non-Christians and infidels to persist
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For complex and debatable historical reasons, the Frame rs of the
American First Amendment chose to incorporate both the
“antiestablishment” and the “free exercise” principles in our
Constitution. Neither secularism nor toleration is the American way;
in fact, this system was radically new at the time58 and remains today
sufficiently unusual that it does not have a ready name. For lack of a
better term, many Americans call it “separation of church and state,”
but that term does not appear in the Constitution. It is in fact a
theological term coined by Roger Williams, a seventeenth-century
Christian who sought to protect religious bodies against state
manipulation.59 The term entered the American political lexicon
when President Thomas Jefferson adopted it as a crowd-pleasing way
of reassuring Baptists that their vision of the state was embodied in
the constitution. 60
There is no reliable shorthand for the American dual system of
religious guarantees. Instead, we must apply the Van Alstyne method
to the text itself. “Establishment of religion” has a relatively clear
core meaning—it means government endorsement and support of a
favored religion or religions, possibly, though not necessarily , coupled
with use of state power to coerce adherence to its tenets. “Free
and even perish in their erroneous beliefs, as long as the State of Alabama can publicly point
out the “correct” view upon which they believe the United States was founded:
In Moore’s eyes, it is the special virtue of the Jewish and Christian conception of God
that it allows us to make a twofold claim: to recognize in public the beliefs on which
our rights are founded, and to refuse to mandate for others that they must hold the
same beliefs. He is free to exercise his duty as chief justice in calling attention to the
moral foundation of our rights, without by the same deed trying to force Jewish or
Christian belief upon Muslims, Buddhists, atheists, agnostics, or anyone else.
As Justice Moore sees it, the principle of religious liberty enunciated in our great
founding documents does exactly no more and no less. It calls attention to the moral
foundation of our rights in our inalienable duty to our Creator, and in the same
formulation declares the fundamental liberty of all consciences to choose the form
and manner of fulfilling that duty.
Michael Novak, That Ten Commandments Case, NAT’L R EV. ONLINE, Dec. 16, 2002, at
http://www.nationalreview.com/script/printpage.asp?ref=/novak/novak121602.asp (on file with
the Duke Law Journal).
58. See generally WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: R ELIGION AND THE
AMERICAN R EPUBLIC (1986).
59. See R OGER WILLIAMS, MR. COTTON’S LETTER LATELY PRINTED, EXAMINED AND
ANSWERED (1644), reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF R OGER WILLIAMS 392 (Russell
& Russell, Inc. 1963) (“ When they have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of separation
between the garden of the church and the wilderness of the world, God hath ever broke down
the wall itself . . . and made His garden a wilderness . . . .”).
60. See DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 17–24 (2002) (describing Jefferson’s use of the phrase in his
letter to the Danbury Baptist Association and its political repercussions).
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exercise” is less perspicuous in its meaning, even today, after more
than two centuries of application of the principle. “Free” must surely
mean uncoerced and, to a significant extent, unregulated—but what
of “exercise?” Here the phrase becomes, lexicographically at least,
almost perfectly ambiguous. There is a core meaning that can be
derived from the term in most natural-language uses; that meaning is
something close to “using,” “conducting,” “carrying out,” or “making
active”—implying that the term “free exercise” covers some quantum
of conduct or behavior. There is also, however, a specific theological
meaning, dating back to the seventeenth century, which is given by
the Oxford English Dictionary as “[t]he practice and performance of
rites and ceremonies, worship, etc.; the right or permission to
celebrate the observances (of a religion).”61 To give this meaning to
the term would suggest that it covers significantly less conduct than if
the previous meaning is given. And so the meaning of “the free
exercise” of religion is problematic as a matter of definition. It could
cover a wide range of conduct when engaged in for religious motives;
or it could mean simply the freedom to conduct “rites and
ceremonies.”
However, the Van Alstyne method does not permit
discouragement when a precise line is hard to draw at the outset. To
conclude that the phrase is ambiguous is not the same as concluding
that it is meaningless. That is, taking the two definitions above as
poles between which the proper constitutional definition is to be
found, we should note that some meanings are already excluded. To
begin with, “free exercise” does not mean nothing—because neither
the broadest possible definition (all religiously inspired conduct) nor
the narrowest possible definition (some but not all ritual conduct) is
nothing, and the space between them is both finite and real. To
illustrate this and other interpretations of the Clause, I employ a
further refinement of the method—the Venn diagrams that Bill
himself employs to useful effect in Chapter 1 of Interpretations,
entitled “A Graphic Representation of the Speech Clause.”62 Below,
then, is what the text and the ambiguity have produced so far.

61.
1989).
62.

5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 529 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed.
V AN ALSTYNE, supra note 15, at 21–49.
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1=All possible conduct. 2=All conduct that could possibly be
protected by a generously read Free Exercise Clause. 3=All conduct
that is ritual or liturgical in nature. 4=Some subset of ritual or
liturgical conduct that is covered by the narrowest admissible
reading of the word “exercise” in its religious meaning.
Figure 1. The irreducible meaning of this Free Exercise Clause must
lie somewhere between the borders of 2 and the borders of 4,
inclusive. Note that no matter where drawn, this border includes
some conduct.

The Clause as used in this Constitution, then, covers something.
Note also that the two poles (on the one hand, all conduct and on the
other, only ritual conduct) exclude at least one definition. Because
both liturgical and nonliturgical conduct are conduct, it cannot be the
case that the Clause protects only non-conduct—e.g., only beliefs
about religion, or speech about religion. Some religiously inspired
conduct is protected; whether or not we can draw the line properly
within the category of conduct, we can deduce with confidence that to
draw it outside the category of conduct is incorrect (for this, see
Figure 2, illustrating a theory which proposes that “the free exercise”
does not cover any conduct).
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Figure 2—The First Clearly Incorrect View of “the Free Exercise”
of Religion.

Having begun, properly, with the text, I now shift into an
examination of the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Clause.
Intriguingly enough, given that the answer in Figure 2 is
demonstrably incorrect, it is this precise view of the Clause that was
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in the first major Free
Exercise case, Reynolds v. United States.63 Reynolds was a challenge to
a prosecution for bigamy of a high official of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints. At the time of the case, Church law
(believed to have been ordained of God through direct revelation to
the martyred prophet Joseph Smith) enjoined the practice of plural
marriage upon male members of the Church, with the injunction
falling with particular force upon Church leaders like George
Reynolds.64 The federal statute under which Reynolds was
prosecuted—the so-called Morrill Act—was specifically and openly
designed to outlaw Mormon polygamy, even when practiced in the
Utah Territory, a thriving settlement established by the Mormons
precisely to escape the persecution that their marriage customs had
inspired elsewhere in the United States.65 The Act was intended by its
63. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
64. See id. at 161 (“[T]he [Mormon] church believed that the practice of polygamy was
directly enjoined upon the male members thereof by the Almighty God . . . refusing to practice
polygamy . . . when circumstances would admit, would be punished, and . . . the penalty for such
failure and refusal would be damnation in the life to come.”).
65. See Morrill Act, ch. 126, § 1, 12 Stat. 501, 501 (1862) (repealed 1910) (criminalizing the
practice of polygamy). For the history of the Morrill Act, see LEONARD J. ARRINGTON &
DAVIS BITTON, THE MORMON EXPERIENCE 172 (2d ed. 1992). For a less friendly view of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, see generally 1 SHERLOCK HOLMES, supra note 2,
at 1.
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sponsor to carry into effect the pledge of the 1860 Republican
platform that the party, once elected, would eradicate the “twin relics
of barbarism—Polygamy, and Slavery.”66 Faced with imprisonment
for obeying the unconditional command of both his faith and his
church, Reynolds asked the Supreme Court to find his conduct
protected by “the free exercise” of religion. The Court could have
done so; or it could have found that this conduct—plural marriage
among consenting adults—did not fall within the conduct protected
by the Clause, and then explained why not. Instead, the Court did
neither; it simply rewrote the Clause to match Figure 2. Under the
First Amendment, the Court said, “Congress was deprived of all
legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions
which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order.”67
The Court read “exercise” not to include “exercise,” and it did so by
using an essential tool of a “special” theory of judicial review. Instead
of parsing the language of this First Amendment, it turned to
Jefferson’s letter to the Danbury Baptists and concluded that,
whatever this Amendment said, Jefferson’s statement that “the
legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and not
opinions,” was the actual meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.68
Polygamy was proscribable first because it was not “mere belief” or
“opinion” and second because it was “in violation of social duties or
subversive of good order.”69 The Court reached the latter conclusion
because “[p]olygamy has always been odious among the northern and
western nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the
Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of
Asiatic and of African people.”70 Thus did the first “special” theory of
the Free Exercise Clause either render the Clause a nullity or limit its
reach to protection of conduct that was not “odious”—and that was
thus unlikely ever to face proscription in the first place. “The Free
Exercise” thus came to mean, at best, “the freedom to engage in
conduct approved by the majority” (see Figure 3) and at worst “the
66. R EPUBLICAN PLATFORM OF 1856, reprinted in N ATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840–
1972, at 27 (Donald Bruce Johnson & Kirk H. Porter eds., 5th ed. 1973); see also ARRINGTON &
BITTON, supra note 65, at 172.
67. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (emphasis added).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 164, 166. But see Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 346–47 (1890), in which the Court
approved a State law that deprived State citizens of their civil rights for “espousing” a belief in
plural ma rriage or “adhering to” an organization that “espous[ed] such a belief.”
70. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
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freedom to believe whatever one wants as long as one makes no
attempt to practice it”—and so, to a remarkable extent, it remains to
this day for many thinkers, both lawyers and nonlawyers.

1=Conduct not odious to a majority. 2=Religiously inspired conduct
by minorities. 3=Conduct by religious minorities to which a majority
has no serious objection.
Figure 3—The “optimistic” version of the Reynolds vision of the
Clause. Because majorities seldom ban conduct to which they have
no objection, the Clause in effect protects no conduct.

Reynolds represents, in Van Alstyne’s terms, a classic “special”
theory of judicial review. That is because the Reynolds Court, like the
more recent theorists Van Alstyne chided in his essay,71 rewrote the
Free Exercise Clause because, by its own account, it found the Clause
written for it by the Framers unsatisfactory. Consider the Court’s
explanation for its interpretation of the Clause. If the Free Exercise
Clause provided even presumptive protection for polygamists, the
Court argued, society would collapse.
Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of
religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil
government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a
sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously believed it was her duty to burn
herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be
beyond the power of the civil government to prevent her carrying
her belief into practice?
So here, as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive
dominion of the United States, it is provided that plural marriages

71.

See V AN ALSTYNE, supra note 15, at 7 & nn.21–26, and text accompanying note 27.
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shall not be allowed. Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary
because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land,
and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.
Government could exist only in name under such circumstances. 72

In other words, the Clause is to be read, contrary to its text, as
protecting only “mere opinion,” because to read it as written would
cause anarchy and the collapse of government. In addition, the Court
does not attend to the “line” proposed by the litigants in this
particular case, but rather imagines the most extreme assertions of
religious rites that could be advanced and refutes them instead of the
case actually in front of it. The Framers of the First Amendment
simply did not understand the nature of what they were doing, and it
was the duty of the Supreme Court to correct their work by
substituting for “the free exercise” of religion “the mere opinion
about.” In Van Alstynian terms, this interpretation is bankrupt; what
is remarkable is that today, nearly 130 years after it was first
promulgated, this first “special theory” of the Free Exercise Clause is
still considered persuasive—sufficiently so that the Rehnquist Court
cited it as the founding document of Free Exercise jurisprudence.73
The Reynolds scheme, however, did have the advantage of
clarity: the Free Exercise Clause in effect protects no religiously
inspired conduct. If we reject the Reynolds rule, then, we must
continue the attempts at line drawing. By hypothesis, the Free
Exercise Clause protects some conduct. But how much? The secular
imagination at once leaps to human sacrifice and other hideous
atavisms that the religious are thought secretly to be hankering to
indulge in. And while we may not necessarily share the popular
conception of the religious generally as semideranged refugees from
the cast of Deliverance,74 we should take note that religious
justification has been claimed within recent memory for child abuse,
child neglect, child murder, mass suicide , and attempted germ warfare
against nonbelievers.75 For this reason, no one is likely to propose the
anti-Reynolds rule (see Figure 4), though Judge Michael McConnell

72. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166–67.
73. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (citing Reynolds).
74. DELIVERANCE (Elmer Productions & Warner Bros. 1972) (depicting rural Southerners
as murderous, subverbal psychopaths).
75. See, e.g., GARRETT EPPS, TO AN UNKNOWN GOD: R ELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL
66–89 (2001) (depicting the crimes of the Rajneesh cult).
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of the Tenth Circuit, before ascending the bench, proposed something
very close.76

1=Conduct the state may legitimately prohibit. 2=Religiously
inspired conduct. Because there is no overlap, the state may not
prohibit any religiously inspired conduct.
Figure 4—The anti-Reynolds scheme of “the Free Exercise ” of
religion.

The most durable proposal after Reynolds was originated by
Justice William J. Brennan in Sherbert v. Verner.77 The Sherbert rule
states that government may “burden” free exercise only when the
regulation is narrowly tailored, or necessary, to further a compelling
governmental interest.78 This rule has received more than its fair
share of criticism after the fact;79 but, like many of Justice Brennan’s
creations, it has significant virtues of judicial craft, and actually
squares reasonably well with the Van Alstyne method.
The first important contrast between the Brennan method and
the Reynolds scheme is its litigant-centered perspective. The
Reynolds Court rather unselfconsciously adopted the viewpoint of the
religious majority. Because most of the public considered George
Reynolds’ conduct “odious,” it could be banned. Justice Brennan,

76. See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
CHI . L. R EV. 1109, 1148 (1990) (proposing the rule that “[a] government interest is sufficient [to
overcome a Free Exercise claim] if it is so important that it is not conceivable that the
government would waive it even if the religious needs of the majority so require d”).
77. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
78. Id. at 406.
79. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma , 67 MINN. L. R EV.
545, 548–57 (1983) (discussing the difficulties with the Supreme Court’s post-Sherbert approach
to free exercise).
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however, begins by asking what impact the challenged restriction has
on the religious challenger: “‘[I]f the purpose or effect of a law is to
impede the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate
invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid’”
regardless of the nature of the burden—“direct” or “indirect.”80 Note
that the effect of this passage is to take the religious majority’s
subjective state off the table. Whether motivated by antireligious
design, sectarian discrimination, or simple indifference, the majority
must satisfy the Clause if its legislation “impedes the observance” of
any religion or religions. “Observance” can plainly mean either ritual
behavior or nonritual behavior; the Clause, in the Brennan scheme,
makes no necessary distinction between them. Nor does the Brennan
test depend on any distinction between outright prohibition and
government conduct that raises the cost of the behavior. In Sherbert,
South Carolina had denied Mrs. Sherbert unemployment benefits for
refusing Saturday work. As a Seventh-Day Adventist, Mrs. Sherbert
could obviously argue that the observance of the Sabbath was
extremely central to her faith. But the Brennan formulation required
no such claim. The requisite showing was simply that the law forced
her “to choose between following the precepts of her religion and
forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.”81
Requiring such a choice, the Court said, places “the same kind of
burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed
against appellant for her Saturday worship.”82
After identifying the burden, the Sherbert opinion then unveils a
test that is taken from cases regarding the Speech Clause. This choice
has been subject to subsequent criticism,83 but in fact is neither
arbitrary nor excessive. Both Clauses inhabit the same First
Amendment and use almost identical wording—prohibiting
“abridg[ment]” of “the freedom of speech” and “prohibit[ion]” of
“the free exercise” of religion.84 The burden of proof would seem to
fall on those who seek to interpret them differently, rather than on
those defending the interpretive choice in Sherbert.

80. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883–89 (1990), for Justice Scalia ’s
criticism of the Sherbert balancing test.
84. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Having established the test as “strict scrutiny,” the Sherbert
opinion then asked what “compelling interests” the State was seeking
to advance by its rejection of Mrs. Sherbert’s claims. As noted above,
it is at this point that the persistent anxieties of the religious majority
tend to become involved in the analysis. Permit one Sabbatarian to
claim exemption from Saturday work, the analysis often suggests, and
soon droves of layabouts will be joining the Adventist faith to avoid
work, the idle and vicious of the Southeast will be moving to South
Carolina, fraudulent antipopes will be establishing new churches that
ban work on any day of the week, and temple prostitution and human
sacrifices will be slouching toward the Low Country to trouble the
God-fearing people thereof. In a sense, the calm tone of the Sherbert
opinion in the face of imaginary heresies may be its most profound
achievement. As the opinion notes, the state could suggest only one
concrete adverse consequence of an exemption: “a possibility that the
filing of fraudulent claims by unscrupulous claimants feigning
religious objections to Saturday work might not only dilute the
unemployment compensation fund but also hinder the scheduling by
employers of necessary Saturday work.”85 A dismal (though limited)
picture; but, employing the device of the burden of proof, the opinion
pointed out that those who painted it had no proof that was drawn
from life. “[T]here is no proof whatever to warrant such fears of
malingering or deceit.”86

85.
86.

Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
Id.
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This, then, is the graphic representation of the Free Exercise
Clause as drawn by the Sherbert Court:

1=Religiously inspired conduct. 2=Conduct the government has a
“compelling interest” in regulating. 3=Religiously inspired conduct
that may be prohibited. 1–3=“The Free Exercise of Religion.”
Figure 5—The Brennan version of the Free Exercise Clause, or the
Sherbert Test. Thus the Clause protects some but not all religiously
inspired conduct, and requires the government to explain why a
proposed burden is necessary.

The rule is not quite as simple as the Reynolds rule; a court
applying it must still determine whether a given class of acts falls
within 1, then whether it also falls within 3. But this is a two-step
calculation, relatively transparent (by which I mean that an honest
explanation of how it is being applied can be understood readily by
most readers, whether they agree with the calculations made or not).
The Court managed to apply the Sherbert test successfully in a
number of cases.87 Not only does the rule provide protection for some
but not all religious conduct, it furthers the goals of consistency by
applying the same test to Free Exercise questions that is applied to
Free Speech matters and to many Equal Protection claims as well. It
additionally gives litigants a common vocabulary in which to discuss

87. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 139–41 (1987)
(reversing a state’s denial of unemployment benefits to a worker discharged for her refusal to
work on her Sa bbath, based on religious beliefs she adopted after commencing her
employment); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716–19 (1981) (reversing a state’s denial of
unemployment benefits to a worker discharged for his refusal, based on his religious beliefs, to
work on an armaments production line); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–19 (1972)
(preventing application of a state compulsory education law that conflicted with Amish religious
objections to higher education).
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the question, and requires of the Court a relatively clear explanation
of why a decision is being made. It is of course not utterly predictable,
but that is not a requirement of an interpretive theory; as Bill wrote,
“many of the problems of constitutional adjudication are not
imagined, . . . they are not contrived, and . . . they do not proceed
solely from judges who are mere ideologues.”88
Nonetheless, by 1990 the Court had evidently grown weary of
Sherbert, and it manufactured the opportunity to overturn it in
Employment Division v. Smith.89 Smith offers a tempting target for
critique in Van Alstynian terms. To begin with, the Smith majority
did not display an “exceptional willingness to listen, to consider, and
to be very careful.”90 In fact, the majority remanded the case to pose a
question that none of the litigants had asked and then gave that
question an answer that none of the parties had discussed.91 It
reintroduced the perspective of the religious majority as the most
important issue, and further reaffirmed the Reynolds rule that
conduct of any kind is presumptively unprotected by the Free
Exercise Clause.92 Its one refinement on Reynolds was a concession
that restrictions on religious conduct that were enacted either because
the conduct was religious or with the intent of discriminating against a
religious group were subject to the “compelling interest test.”93 In
addition, inadvertently oppressive unemployment compensation
regulations were also subject to the test.94 But other cases where the
majority enacted “neutral and generally applicable” rules that,
through indifference or ignorance, had the effect of prohibiting
religious conduct were to be judged, at most, by the permissive
“rational basis” test.95 Under the new test, a test that claimed to
simplify Free Exercise jurisprudence, the topology began to become
somewhat complicated:

88. V AN ALSTYNE, supra note 15, at 15.
89. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
90. V AN ALSTYNE, supra note 15, at 13 (footnote omitted).
91. EPPS, supra note 75, at 216–21.
92. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877–82.
93. See id. at 882 (“There being no contention that Oregon’s drug law represents an
attempt to regulate religious beliefs, the communication of religious beliefs, or the raising of
one’s children in those beliefs, the rule to which we have adhered ever since Reynolds plainly
controls.”).
94. Id. at 882–84.
95. Id. at 877–82.
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1=Religiously inspired conduct. 2=Prohibitions on religiously
inspired conduct enacted because the conduct is religious.
3=Inadvertently oppressive rules relating to unemployment
compensation. 4=Prohibitions on conduct enacted in ignorance or
indifference of the religious inspiration of the conduct for some
believers. 5=Conduct that is protected by some other more favored
provision of the Bill of Rights. 6=Area of 5 that is also part of 4.
“The Free Exercise” of religion=2+3+6
Figure 6—The Smith Version of the Free Exercise Clause.

This complexity, I would suggest, is one signal of what is
arguably wrong with the test. In effect, the Smith Court attempted to
regraft the Reynolds rule onto a First Amendment doctrine that had
been extensively developed in the previous century. This led the
opinion’s author, Justice Antonin Scalia, to engage in the crassest sort
of doctrinal redefinition. The Smith opinion relies on Reynolds as its
precedent (bear in mind, of course, that the law that George
Reynolds had been accused of violating was passed in order to
suppress the Latter-Day Saints, thus arguably meaning that Reynolds,
as the Smith Court read it, was not a Reynolds case). The opinion
rewrites the United States Reports to create a hitherto undiscovered
category of cases involving something called “hybrid rights”—
combinations of free exercise with other rights such as the First
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Amendment right of speech96 or the Due Process right to control the
education and upbringing of children.97 Finally, it relies most heavily
for precedent on a case that is not only widely reviled but has been
overruled.98
In fact, the opinion’s use of precedent is so disingenuous and
tendentious that it calls to mind the picture one prominent scholar
recently ridiculed as the current picture of “the great judge”:
the man (or woman) who has the intelligence to discern the best rule
of law for the case at hand and then the skill to perform the brokenfield running through earlier cases that leaves him free to impose
that rule: distinguishing one prior case on the left, straight-arming
another one on the right, high-stepping away from another
precedent about to tackle him from the rear, until (bravo!) he
reaches the goal—good law. 99

The remarkable vividness and cynicism of this picture perhaps stems
from self-loathing, as the high-stepping judge of Smith is himself the
censorious critic of precedential manipulation, Antonin Scalia.
Perhaps we should view his reductive view of common law judging as
a cry for help—Stop me before I distinguish more. In any event,
whether other “great judges” actually manipulate precedent so
callously or not, Scalia as author of Smith did. But only for the greater
good. To allow the Free Exercise Clause to approach its textual
meaning would subject the nation to a full spectral parade of horrors
that must necessarily ensue if a State were to be forced to allow
peyotists to consume their sacrament under ritual conditions: “[I]f
‘compelling interest’ really means what it says . . . , many laws will not
meet the test. Any society adopting such a system would be courting
anarchy . . . .”100 To allow religious claimants to argue for exemption
would make it impossible to enforce laws
ranging from compulsory military service to the payment of taxes, to
health and safety regulation[s] such as manslaughter and child
neglect laws, compulsory vaccination laws, drug laws, and traffic
laws; to social welfare legislation such as minimum wage laws, child

96. See id. at 882 (citing West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
as a “hybrid” case).
97. See id. at 881 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) as a “hybrid” case).
98. See id. at 879–80 (citing Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940),
overruled by West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 642 (1943)).
99. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 9 (1997).
100. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
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labor laws, animal cruelty laws, environmental protection laws, and
laws providing for equality of opportunity for the races. 101

If the prospect of total collapse of orde red liberty were not daunting
enough, the opinion further notes that application of the “compelling
interest” test would mean that “federal judges will regularly balance
against the importance of general laws the significance of religious
practice,”102 a possibility so self-evidently horrible that the opinion
need not explain why it is any worse than any other exercise in
judicial balancing. And perhaps the most important reason why the
Free Exercise Clause must be defined out of existence is that use of
the “compelling interest” test in this disfavored context “would
subvert its rigor in the other fields where it is applied. ”103 Since, as
noted above, one of those “other fields” is another almost identically
worded clause of the First Amendment, the necessity of such
subversion is not entirely clear. But at any rate, the Smith majority
reinstated the Reynolds rule with additions required by subsequent
doctrine. It is, in effect, as if a scientist subsequent to Galileo and
Copernicus had proclaimed “eppur non si muove”104 and reinstated
the Ptolemaic system, suitably complicated to accommodate the
thousands of observations of planetary movements made since the
change from an earth-centered to a sun-centered planetary system.
“Entitia non multiplicanda,” supposedly warned the blessed William
of Ockham.105 It is worth discussing here the usefulness of Ockham’s
Razor to both descriptive and prescriptive jurisprudence. The rule
begins life as a technique for explaining natural phenomena, and its
validity should be clear: if only a small number of causal factors
completely explains a phenomenon, then including other factors in

101. Id. at 888–89 (citations omitted).
102. Id. at 889 n.5.
103. Id. at 888.
104. Loosely translated, this Italian phrase means “And yet, it does not move.” As the
reader will note, this is a variation on one of the most famous phrases in Western history, only
slightly less famous than “In the beginning was the Word.” The original, “eppur si muove,”
(“and yet it moves”) was supposedly delivered by Galileo Galilei after he had been induced by
the threat of torture to sign a minute retracting the claim in his published works that the Earth
moves around the Sun, rather than vice versa. WILLIAM R. SHEA & MARIANO ARTIGAS,
GALILEO IN R OME 195 (2003).
105. “Entities are not to be multiplied (without reason). ” Ockham’s surviving texts do not
use this formulation, but his writings do endorse the principle. See, e.g., STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward Zalta ed., Fall 2002 ed.), at http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/fall2002/entries/ockham/#4.1 (last visited Aug. 25, 2004).
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the explanation requires us to posit natural causes that actually have
no effect—or, in other words, ghost causes, disembodied specters.106
Why is an overly complex rule to be eschewed in law? Well, first,
as descriptive jurisprudence it is more prone to inaccuracy and
incoherence than is a less complex one; second, as prescriptive
jurisprudence, it is more open to evasion and manipulation—which, I
suggest, is exactly what has happened to the so-called “Smith rule.”
Science historian Thomas Kuhn has noted that this kind of baroque
excess is a mark of a “normal science” that is overdue for a
“paradigm shift.”107
The very complexity of the Smith rule thus suggests that it cannot
be right. In fact, from the discussion above, it seems clear that the
Smith Court has simply developed another “special” form of judicial
review. It might be summed up as follows—“Do not give full effect to
all Constitutional provisions, as doing that may water down the ones
you care about; resist any attempt to draw lines involving these
inferior provisions.” This is simply a special case of the practice of
judicially changing embarrassing or “archaic” provisions, and thus by
definition does not fit the Van Alstyne method.
In this connection, it is intriguing to note that Justice O’Connor,
in her concurrence, claims credit for sticking to Sherbert while
managing to insert a new provision that significantly complicates that
rule. O’Connor notes that “we have respected both the First
Amendment’s express textual mandate and the governmental interest
in regulation of conduct by requiring the government to justify any
substantial burden on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling
state interest and by means narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.”108 So far, so orthodox. But Justice O’Connor writes not to
praise free exercise for peyotists but to bury it. Under her version of
the Sherbert rule, the peyotists would lose without any of the
painstaking factual examination the Sherbert Court seemed to
prescribe of the asserted State interests. Instead, she writes, peyote
may be criminalized even in the ritual context because “uniform

106. Id.
107. See THOMAS S. K UHN, THE STRUCTURE OF S CIENTIFIC R EVOLUTIONS 66–76 (3d ed.
1996) (“So long as the tools a paradigm supplies continue to prove capable of solving the
problems it defines, science moves fastest and penetrates most deeply through confident
employment of these tools. . . . The significance of crises is the indication they provide that an
occasion for retooling has arrived.”)
108. Smith, 494 U.S. at 894 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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application of the criminal prohibition at issue is essential to the
effectiveness of Oregon’s stated interest in preventing any possession
of peyote.”109
It is tempting to say that at this point Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence has labored mightily and given birth to a mouse—
tempting, but unfair. A mouse may be small, but it is at least a living
creature, capable of having some effect in the real world. Justice
O’Connor’s rule seems quite negligible by comparison; it seems to
forbid “prohibit[ion] of the free exercise [of religion]” except where
the majority does not want anybody doing some particular thing that a
religious minority must do. If a prohibition is across the board, then
that ends the inquiry. This conclusion must be true because at the
time of the Smith case Oregon, of states with a significant Native
population, was the only one that refused to make any
accommodation for religious use of peyote. The track records of the
other states allowing religious exemptions were readily available for
examination; a court or a Justice possessing “an exceptional
willingness to listen, to consider, and to be very careful,”110 should
have been willing either to look at the evidence suggesting that
peyote exemptions do not cripple drug-enforcement efforts or at
worst to remand the case for fact-finding on that issue. Instead,
Justice O’Connor simply adopts the implied finding in Oregon’s
statute and substitutes a State’s unwillingness to accommodate for the
required near impossibility of accommodation.
The O’Connor version of “the free exercise” of religion might
look something like the next figure:

109.
110.

Id. at 905 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
V AN ALSTYNE, supra note 15, at 13 (footnote omitted).
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1=Conduct the government wishes to prohibit for a “compelling”
reason. 2=Religiously inspired conduct. 3=Conduct the government
wishes to prohibit for reasons which are noncompelling in and of
themselves but are augmented by a desire not to make any
exceptions.
“The Free Exercise” of religion=2–(1 and 3)
Figure 7—The O’Connor version of the “Free Exercise” Clause.

Considered as a “special” theory of judicial review, the
O’Connor version thus might stand for something like “give full effect
to the Clause except in cases where the state would prefer not to.”
Despite the praise given the rhetorical flourishes in Justice
O’Connor’s opinion, there is reason to think that its adoption by a
majority of the Court would not be a step forward in interpreting this
Free Exercise Clause.
The majority has, however, encountered serious problems in
applying the Smith rule—problems that should not be surprising if we
view the Smith opinion as, in effect, an attempt to turn back the clock
to the day of Reynolds.111 The more wheels within wheels a theory
requires, the more likely it is that sooner or later one of the wheels
will come off. The Court found itself facing precisely that prospect
when it attempted to apply Smith to another case.

111. If we do so view it, the Court’s subsequent dismissal of Congress’s statutory attempt to
turn back the clock to the days of Sherbert, which crippled the enforcement clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, takes on an even more poignant air of illegitimacy. See City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act as
exceeding Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah112
concerned a city that had outlawed “ritual slaughter” of animals in
order to prevent a congregation of Santerists from opening a house of
worship on property they had bought within the city limits.113 Justice
Scalia had cited the lower court opinion in this case as an example of
a “neutral, generally applicable” law that might be threatened if the
Sherbert rule was applied.114 But in fact the ordinances were textually
aimed at religious practice—it was the closest thing to his
hypothetical statute “prohibit[ing] bowing down before a golden
calf”115 that reality is likely to produce. Beyond their lack of textual
neutrality, they had been passed in an atmosphere of bigotry and
included exemptions designed to protect every other group that killed
animals except the Santerists.116 The Court thus was able to identify
no fewer than four ways the law failed scrutiny—it was textually
discriminatory, it was motivated by religious animus, the behavior it
covered made it not neutral, and the behavior it exempted made it
not gene rally applicable.117 Any one of these would have been enough
to place it in a separate category where Sherbert did apply. This
opinion changed the Smith paradigm, adding new spheres to its model
of the heavens:

112. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
113. Id. at 525–29.
114. Smith, 494 U.S. at 889 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla. 1989)).
115. Id. at 878.
116. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 526–29.
117. Id. at 535–38.
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1=Religiously inspired conduct. 2=Religiously inspired conduct that
is prohibited by a norm that includes exemptions amounting to a
religious gerrymander. 3=Religiously inspired conduct prohibited by
a legal norm whose underlying values suggest it is inspired by
religious animus. 4=Prohibitions on religiously inspired conduct that
were enacted amid circumstances suggesting religious animus.
5=Conduct, whether religious or not, that is prohibited in
furtherance of a “compelling interest.”
“The Free Exercise” of religion is all that part of 1 that is also
covered by 2, 3, or 4 or any combination thereof and is not included
within 5.
Figure 8—The Lukumi Babalu Aye version of “ the Free Exercise.”

The attempt to refine the Free Exercise Clause has thus
complicated it almost to the point of incoherence.
CONCLUSION
We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.
“Little Gidding”
T.S. Eliot, Four Quartets

So, our tour of the Free Exercise Clause has shown us what I
consider to be a classic example of paradigm collapse—a scheme that
becomes unworkably complicated as its proponents attempt to adapt
it to new factual situations. The Lukumi Babalu Aye formulation is
almost cabbalistic in its complexity and is unlikely to prove workable
over the long run. Of the many schemes laid out here, only two seem
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workable—the negation of the Clause by the Reynolds Court and the
“compelling interest” test proposed by Justice Brennan. The
Reynolds rule, while workable, is not an interpretation of this
Constitution, but a judicial manipulation of the line because of an
anxiety or objection about its implications. This conclusion,
anticlimactically, leaves us with the Brennan formulation as the sole
candidate for a rule that applies this Constitution.
That the Brennan test seems to fulfill the requirements of the
Van Alstyne method, of course, does not imply that it is the only test
that could possibly do so. The fascinating aspect of our analysis is that
the Van Alstyne method is not necessarily stultified or even
embarrassed as a jurisprudential practice by the fact that it has been
applied and has produced a preference for a “liberal” result. Nor is
there any guarantee that similar applications of the method will
produce “liberal” results elsewhere; to consider only one example,
imagine the result if the method were used to tease out the practical
meaning of the Second Amendment.118 A method that rigorously
applies criteria of logic, consistency, fidelity to text, and elegance
seems quite likely to elicit some results that will displease every
constitutional camp. As a progressive, I favor certain policy results; as
a constitutional scholar, I am aware that the Constitution dictates
certain arrangements and absolutely forbids others. Further, I am
aware that the set of required and permissible arrangements under
the Constitution cannot possibly square completely with my desired
set of policy outcomes. This painful knowledge is the basis of maturity
as a constitutional interpreter; and yet the human mind seems
infinitely capable of producing reasons, or rationalizations, why this
simply cannot be true—that surely, if America is good, and I am
good, then the things I want for America must be the same thing its
constitutive document requires.
It is of course this wishful thinking that the Van Alstyne method
is directed against. Though we do not believe in the Evil Deceiver of
Descartes’ theory—a demon who seeks to convince us that the

118. See, e.g., William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to
Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236, 1241–55 (1994) (reaching the conclusion that “until the Supreme
Court manages to express the central premise of the Second Amendment more fully and far
more appropriately than it has done thus far, the constructive role of the NRA . . . ought itself
not lightly to be dismissed”).
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outside world exists even though it does not119 —we must believe, and
believe strongly, in the evil deceiver inside each of us, that strives to
convince us that the realm of law and the realm of desire are one and
the same. For it is precisely in the painful disjuncture between law
and desire—between what I think should be and what I must concede
is—that maturity both as a lawyer and as an advocate of change
begins. Without a firm commitment to searching for the boundary
between law and desire, our work as scholars will be of little use, as
we will never know whether and to what extent we are simply using
the Constitution as a mirror to reflect back to us, suitably enhanced,
our own faces. I hesitate to claim that I embody such maturity; but to
the extent that I do, I must give much of the credit to the lessons I
learned from Bill Van Alstyne. Perhaps, indeed, Bill himself will
decide that my analysis of his method is “thoroughly shoddy.” If so, I
expect no less than demolition, even though it be my own scholarly
cadaver that is flung over the Reichenbach Fall.120 My task, then as
always, will be “to listen, to consider, and to be very careful.”121

119. For a discussion of the “evil” or “malicious deceiver,” see R ENÉ DESCARTES,
MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 18 (John Cottingham trans. & ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press rev. ed. 1996) (1641).
120. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
121. V AN ALSTYNE, supra note 15, at 13 (footnote omitted).

